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ETHNOGRAPHY IS DOGMATICS:
MAKING DESCRIPTION CENTRAL
TO SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY
by Nicholas Adams and Charles Elliott
THE purpose of this article is to suggest that dogmatictheology is best practised through description of theworld. Its method is to marry two unlikely characters: Karl
Bardi, Swiss Reformed theologian, and Michel Foucault, French
atheist philosopher and historian. The thesis we propose can be
presented directly. Barth is well known for insisting, in his ethics
lectures in Munster and Bonn (1928/29 and 1930/31 respec-
tively) and volume II of his Church Dogmatics, that ethics is dog-
matics. Foucault famously rejected ethics which makes universal
normative claims in favour of producing descriptions of historical
phenomena and letting the reader make moral judgments
accordingly. His method, we suggest, understands ethics as
ethnography. We have taken these two ways of thinking together
and excluded the middle term: ethics. This has yielded the
abbreviated form: ethnography is dogmatics.
The task we have set ourselves is not easy, however. Barth's
'ethics is dogmatics' approach is far from straightforward. His
idea that ethics is best understood as 'a special elucidation of
the doctrine of sanctification', and that a general (philosophical)
conception of ethics 'coincides exactly with the conception of
sin' is not quickly explained.' Saying something intelligent about
1
 Karl Barth, Ethics (ed. D. Braun, tr. G Bromiley. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981),
p. 3; Barth Church Dogmatics II/2 (ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance,
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), p. 518. For a good account of the relationship
between ethics and dogmatics in Barth see Eberhard Jungel, 'Evangelium und
Gesetz' in BarthStudien (Koln: Benziger, 1982), pp. 180-209. Jungel shows how
Barth reverses Luther's 'law and gospel' to 'gospel and law', and indicates that this
reversal is a good summary for understanding why, in the relationship between
dogmatics and ethics, dogmatics has priority, for Barth. Where Luther says law
articulates tasks and gospel articulates promises, Barth insists both tasks and
promises, law and gospel, must be taken together. Rather than the 'proper
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Foucault's 'ethics is ethnography' method (as we shall charac-
terise it) is hazardous, because to summarise his approach
theoretically is rather obviously to miss its point and to give an
account of it in the very terms it rejects. The first and second
parts of this article will nevertheless try to do justice to some of
their insights about ethics and suggest what can be learned from
them. The third and fourth parts will attempt to do what die
previous sections advertise: describe things. They form the crux
of the article. The final section will summarise our intentions
and suggest how 'ethnography is dogmatics' might influence
future dogmatic inquiry and, in particular, the part of dogmatic
inquiry often called Christian ethics.
1. Ethics is Dogmatics
In a fragment entitled 'the world of conflicts', which forms part
of E. Bethge's edition of Bonhoeffer's Ethics, Bonhoeffer declares
'The knowledge of good and evil seems to be the aim of all
ethical reflection. The first task of Christian ethics is to invalidate
this knowledge'.2 Bonhoeffer notes that it is only after eating of
the tree of knowledge that Adam and Eve come to know good
and evil. Thus this very knowledge is a consequence of the Fall.
'Man at his origin knows only one thing: God . . . The knowledge
of good and evil shows that he is no longer at one with this
origin'.s What is true of our first ancestors is true a fortiori of our
own pursuits. Just as knowledge of good and evil is a product of
difference' (Luther) we should seek the 'proper relation' (Barth) between gospel
and law, i.e. if ethics relates to law, and dogmatics relates to gospel, then Barth's
treatment of the relation between gospel and law illuminates his treatment of the
relation between dogmatics and ethics. For discussion in English see especially
Nigel Biggar, The Hastening That Waits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993);
Timothy Gorringe, Karl Barth Against Hegemony (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 88-93; Eberhard Jiingel, 'Invocation of God as the Ethical Ground of
Christian Action' in Theological Essays I (ed. J. Webster, Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1989), pp. 154-72; John Webster, Barth's Moral Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1998). Happily, these works fully address the question of the relationship between
divine and human action in Barth's work, and preclude the need to revisit this
question here.
2
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (ed. E. Bethge, tr. N. Horton Smith. London: SCM
Press, 1955), p. 3. Note: the order of the articles edited by Bethge was revised in
later editions. The page numbers here refer to the 1998 impression, which follows
the order from the sixth German edition.
3
 Ibid.
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disobedience to God, so attempts to seek after this knowledge
further are extensions of this original sin. Philosophical ethics,
or moral philosophy, are precisely attempts of this kind,
according to Bonhoeffer. That is, they seek knowledge of good
and evil without reference to God. For Bonhoeffer, God is the
only one who can truly tell humans who they are and what is
good. Any knowledge apart from this is knowledge apart from
God, and this is what is meant by sin. As a consequence, for
there to be 'Christian Ethics', which really is Christian, there
must be an enterprise which does not continue this sinful
inquiry but, on the contrary, seeks to learn and practise an
obedience that Adam and Eve refused.
Barth also rehearses this theme and relates it to the way the
tradition has understood the relation between ethics and dog-
matics. He describes, in particular, the gradual separation of
the two. Barth insists that in much post-Reformation thinking
ethics is described as something which goes beyond 'mere'
dogmatics. In the seventeenth century, the 'dogmaticians now
protest what the reformers had taken for granted, namely, that
theology is not just a theoretical but also a practical discipline,
indeed, that it is even more practical than speculative'.4 Once it
becomes conceivable that dogmatics is something other than
practical, then it becomes possible to conceive of a non-dogmatic
discipline that will make up this practical shortfall.
Barth thinks the idea that dogmatic theology is speculative
rather than practical is a modern mistake, and one which cannot
be attributed to the reformers themselves. Any attempt to remedy
the lack which is now attributed to dogmatic theology, in some-
thing called ethics, rests on this mistake and is to be rejected.
This view, presented in his ethics lectures, is conjoined with
Bonhoeffer's remarks from 'the world of conflicts' in volumes
II, III and IV of Church Dogmatics? There Barth suggests non-
dogmatic ethics is a mistake about the nature of dogmatics.
He shows how in the 1940s it depends dangerously on a form
of ethical thinking (in 'pure' philosophy) which sees itself
not as a practical dimension of theology but as an enterprise
4
 Barth, Ethics, p. 7.
5
 For an explicit acknowledgement of Bonhoeffer see Karl Barth, Church
Dogmatics III/4 (ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance. Edinburgh: T&T Clark,
1961), p. 4.
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distinguishable from theology. This is what Barth calls the 'general
conception of ethics' which he sees, in different forms, in the
work of Rousseau, Bentham, Feuerbach and Nietzsche.6 It is
unsurprising that Barth should set his face against this project.
It denies that humans must look to God for an authoritative
revelation of the good.
Thus there are for Barth two dangers: splitting theology into
dogmatics and ethics, and proceeding analogously to a non-
theological (and eventually explicitly non-Christian) general
conception of ethics. These two dangers conspire to produce a
Christian ethics which is insufficiently theological at best, and
which classes Christian ethics as a sub-species of general ethics
at worst.
The slogan 'ethics is dogmatics' is the banner under which
Barth tries, in Church Dogmatics II/2, to revisit this territory and
reclaim it from hostile intellectual forces. 'Our contention is,
however, that the dogmatics of the Christian Church, and
basically the Christian doctrine of God, is ethics'.7 Another way
of putting it is to say that the question 'what is the good?' is the
same question as 'who is God?'. At this point, Barth puts the
question of general ethics behind him. He does not say that it
cannot be done, and he does not say that attempts to give purely
human answers to questions of good and evil are contradictor)'.
He merely says that it is an enterprise with which he is not
concerned. Barth is not surprised that general ethics should be
as keenly discussed as it is in public debate. Indeed it seems to
him that because of the work of God's grace, the question of
the good is inescapably posed to humanity. Nonetheless, such a
human enterprise is a poor substitute for a proper Christian
ethics: 'as a result and in prolongation of the fall, we have
"ethics", or, rather, the multifarious ethical systems, the
attempted human answers to the ethical question'.8
What Barth advertises in ChurchDogmaticsll/2, he continues,
but does not live to complete, in Church Dogmatics FV/4,
fragments of which, unpublished in FV/4 itself, are published as
a posthumous volume in the collected works.9 Here Barth lays
6
 Barth, Church Dogmaticsll/2, p. 514.
7
 Barth, Church Dogmaticsll/2, p. 515.
8
 Barth, Church Dogmaticsll/2, p. 517.
9
 Karl Barth, The Christian Life (tr. G. Bromiley. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981).
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out in greater detail how Christological description informs
human agency. The detail (here and elsewhere) of Barth's
discussion of the relationship between ethics and dogmatics has
been extensively visited, mapped and expounded by Barth
scholars. The thrust of Barth's approach can, however, be sum-
marised, albeit in a superficial way. Barth tries to show that
the task of Christian ethics is in fact a task for the doctrine of
God. Furthermore, that task will be one of illuminating God's
revelation of what is good. For Barth, this means primarily
understanding the force of the command issued to Jesus Christ
and obeyed by him. There is, Barth insists, no meaningful
conception of the good independent of this. When the word is
applied to humans it refers not to a human achievement but to
being sanctified by God.
For Barth one does ethics by describing God and by des-
cribing God's command in Jesus Christ. Ethics is dogmatics.
2. Ethics is Ethnography
To describe Michel Foucault's many-sided project as ethical is
already to risk making a mistake. Foucault distances himself from
ethics. Foucault's purposes are different from Barth's, and his
reasons for abandoning an ethics which sees itself as theorising
the raising of validity claims could not be in starker contrast.
We admit at the outset that Foucault is a most unpromising
person to juxtapose with Barth. Nonetheless, it is probably not a
mistake to understand Foucault's writing as a form of moral dis-
course. It is not strictly ethics, in so far as it refuses the categories
and types of claim that fall under that heading. Yet Foucault
makes a claim on his reader. It is just that for Foucault there is
nothing to be added by trying to explain why this claim is valid.
If the claim is successful, all well and good. If it is not, then
further explanations and protests are fruitless. In this he is,
perhaps, close to Barth. Barth thunders his insistence that
God is the only authority and that Christian speech should
acknowledge only this authority and no other, but he seizes no
opportunity to justify to his readers this insistence. Barth makes
his claim, and he seems to think that nothing is gained by trying
to validate it independently of the values with which this claim
has to do.
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There are many parts of Foucault's work that might serve
the purpose of illustrating his means of making a claim. The
one presented here is well known: the opening of Discipline and
Punish.
Surveiller etpunir, published in 1975, famously opens with a
description of the bloodily botched execution of Robert Francois
Damiens, a soldier who tried to assassinate Louis XV. Drawing
on publications from 1757 (the year of the execution) and on
work by the historian Alexandre Zevaes, Foucault presents the
reader with the spectacle of a man brutally and incompetendy
tortured to death. The details of this death are crucially
important: Foucault offers descriptions of the use of red-hot
pincers, burning sulphur and prolonged repeated attempts at
drawing and quartering. Foucault's intention in what follows it
is to show how the decline of torture and the rise of a new kind
of punishment (the modern prison) occurred in France.
The question to ask Foucault is 'why are you telling us this?'.
The striking aspect of Foucault's style is the uncompromisingly
detailed description and his restraint in commenting on it. He
offers no explicit moral judgments upon the phenomena he
describes, and no validity claims are raised about the practices
he offers for the reader's inspection. Foucault's agency is self-
consciously restricted. The mood of his commentary on die
scenes he represents is rigorously indicative. Any uses of 'must'
or 'should' or 'ought' are generally part of indirect speech.
Foucault's answer to the question why he tells what he tells is
given indirectly. It is striking that Discipline and Punish does not
begin with an account of the book's purposes but begins with
the sentence 'On 2 March 1757 Damiens the regicide was
condemned... ' . '" Only towards the end of the first chapter does
Foucault make explicit what he intends to do: write a genealogy
of modern European systems of punishment." It is from this
delay between direct description and secondary elucidation that
we wish to learn.
It is not our purpose to attempt detailed discussion of this
work. The opening of Discipline and Punish illustrates clearly what
10
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (tr. A Sheridan. London: Penguin,
1977), p. 3.
11
 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 23.
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we wish to take from Foucault. Any moral claim made by
Foucault's writing is not described in theoretical ethical terms.
It is left to the reader to respond to the genealogy. This is not to
say that Foucault hides his moral convictions. Nor is it to say
that Foucault has no interest in moral discourse. It is more that
Foucault does not recognise any surplus value in adding explicit
validity claims to the claims made by his descriptions. His writing
purposely refuses to present itself ethically. Yet it would be naive
to suggest that understanding his work as moral discourse is
purely a function of the reader. It certainly is for the reader to
treat the claim made as a claim, rather than as entertainment or
a museum exhibit, but this can itself only be a response to a
claim.
We realise there are grave hazards in presenting Foucault in
this fashion, even if we admit the extreme sketchiness of our
characterisation of his method. What is true of Discipline and
Punish is, for example, not true of all of Foucault's writing. We
have chosen this work because here Foucault has developed a
rigorously descriptive procedure. It is from this emphatically
descriptive method that we wish to learn in correcting how we
see Christian ethics/dogmatics. It is difficult to generalise about
Foucault, given the different conceptions of his work he offers
in different writings. We undoubtedly oversimplify him and make
no attempt accurately to convey his self-understandings. It would
be easy to show, for example, that he does raise explicit validity
claims for his method in according concepts like 'historical
change' or (in later work) the transcendental concept 'power' a
quasi-metaphysical validity.12 We think, nonetheless, that what
'- Jurgen Habermas has indicated these difficulties: see 'The Critique of Reason
as an Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault' and 'Some Questions
Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault Again' in Jurgen Habermas, The
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (tr. F. Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity, 1987), pp.
238-93. Habermas shows how Foucault, like Heidegger, avoids making grand
metaphysical claims about 'Being' or 'History'; nonetheless, just as Heidegger
claims substantial knowledge about 'disclosure of being' so Foucault claims reliable
descriptions of 'processes of change', and these function in a quasi-metaphysical
way. Habermas objects that Foucault is insufficiently genealogical about his own
genealogical method and altogether too positive about the validity of his own
practices. Furthermore, Foucault smudges the empirical-descriptive meaning of
power with the transcendental meaning of power, allowing the second to be
parasitic on the first. Similar objections can be discerned, with Foucault's implicit
'ontology of violence' more obviously in view, in John Milbank's critique of
Foucault in Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 286-94.
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we have learned from Foucault really has been learned from
Foucault and not from a false belief about his work. Foucault's
self-understandings are less important to us: his practice seems
better than what he says about his practice.13
To say that Foucault does ethics is misleading for the reasons
we have briefly indicated. Nonetheless, it is equally misleading
to say there is Christian ethics. Barth's 'ethics is dogmatics'
approach corrects what is meant by ethics. Yet Barth is content
to allow his writing to be described as a form of Christian
ethics. Clearly it is essential to understand that his 'moral
theology' (as John Webster carefully describes it in drawing
attention to Barth's reformulation of liberal concerns 'through
quite different categories') is an elucidation of that part of the
doctrine of God which bears on human action.14 The word ethics
is problematic when describing both Barth and Foucault. Both
are engaged primarily in forms of description. Barth's is a
description of God's action and human action; Foucault's is a
description of human action alone. Both are moral discourses,
but neither is justified in theoretical ethical terms. Indeed they
reject such terms. That is, they both refuse to be positioned
from outside.
With these provisos in mind, and with the word ethics under
suspicion, for Foucault moral claims are made through descrip-
tion. Ethics is ethnography.
Summary: we wish to advocate ethnography as a dogmatic
task for theology. Furthermore, we suspect there is little added
value in attempts to supplement descriptions of the world with
validity claims about those descriptions. We even doubt the
added value of making the dogmatic presuppositions of descrip-
tion explicit. This is not because we believe accounts of dogmatic
presuppositions are meaningless. Quite the opposite: we agree
wholly that dogmatic elucidations expose what motivate those
descriptions. Our point is precisely that these things are already
at work in the descriptions themselves, and that elucidations
merely elucidate rather than add anything new. We are aiming
at a form of description which acknowledges the dogmatics that
13
 A similar concern (or lack of concern) characterises the superb defence of
Foucault against Habermas byj. M. Bernstein in Recovering Ethical Life (London:
Routledge, 1995), p. 166.
14
 John Webster, Barth's Moral Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), p. 4.
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is at work within it, but is liberated to attend to the practices of
description themselves (rather than substitute dogmatic analysis
or theoretical validity claims for the detail of description). We
see such an attention to descriptive detail in the work of Barth
and Foucault, but wish to marry accounts of God (Barth) and
detailed description of the world (Foucault).
Despite these protestations, in the final section we will
attempt dogmatic elucidation. This is not because we think this
adds anything new. Rather, it is intended as a dispensable
clarification which substantiates our claim to acknowledge the
dogmatics at work within our descriptions.
What follows are two case studies. Description of them affords
an opportunity to illustrate a dogmatic perspective and, in
particular, to draw attention to a perspective implicit in our
Christian moral thought. We have no hermeneutic theory to
justify our accounts. We are describing things, although not
naively, as they appear to two Christians who are trying to make
God's story our story, and who do not wish to have one mode of
speech for describing the world, and a different mode of speech
for speaking of God. We are trying to describe God's world and,
in particular, the weak in God's world.
3. The Chipko movement
The background to the Chipko movement in Northern India
must start with the character of the life of forest dwellers. Seen
from the standpoint of metropolitan political science, these are
the classically marginalised - poor, illiterate, geographically
scattered, with a preponderance of female-headed households
as men tend to be absent, either on the plains or in regional
towns looking for paid employment. Seen more anthropologic-
ally, forest dwellers have a naturally symbiotic relationship with
the forest on which they depend for food, fuel, construction
materials, herbs and the wherewithal for handicrafts. Herbs and
handicrafts represent the major source of 'export' to the plains
and therefore pay for critically important food and grain imports
which are not easily grown in the forest area. As the population
of forest dwellers increases through the natural growth of
population, so access to the forest, especially for export goods,
becomes increasingly important. Theoretically, there is a highly
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precarious balance when the demands made upon the forest by
forest dwellers are equal to the supply of the various outputs
that the forest can produce. As diis balance is approached, forest
dwellers themselves come under greater and greater pressure,
e.g. having to walk further to find valuable herbs or types of
wood suitable for handicrafts.
So far, we have set the picture in terms of the forest and
forest dwellers; in fact, of course, there is an important third
term, namely the Forestry Department. Under the colonial
regime, forest dwellers were seen as ('constructed as', in hermen-
eutic terms) a nuisance, whose activities were to be restricted in
order to allow sole access to prime forest resources for capital-
intensive logging companies. In broad terms, this colonial
attitude survived Independence and, until the Chipko movement
became well-established, the Forestry Department saw its job as
constraining forest dwellers in a way that would maximise high
quality timber yields for plains-based logging companies.
The last important piece of the jigsaw is the employment
effect of both the Forestry Department and the logging
companies. As has already been emphasised, male forest
dwellers seek to supplement their subsistence forest-based
income by selling their labour to employers. The two most
obvious employers in the forest regions are, first, the Forestry
Department and, second, the logging companies. There is thus
a sharp division of interest between those, exclusively men, who
derive their income from the commercial exploitation of the
forest; and those, mostly women, who derive their subsistence
from a more symbiotic relationship with the forest. It will be
immediately clear that, given the structure of Indian society,
economically and politically the latter group is relatively
powerless.
The isolation and remoteness of the Uttar Kannad was
abruptly shattered by the Indo-Chinese war which suddenly made
the region an area of great strategic significance. Into it were
driven military roads used, after the passing of the military
emergency, by logging companies who suddenly found the cost
of extraction of high-quality timber dramatically reduced. With
the extension of logging activities went increased employment
opportunities, further supplemented by the construction of
additional access roads, opening up whole new areas of prime
ETHNOGRAPHY IS DOGMATICS 349
forest. The existing split between paid employment and sub-
sistence employment was reinforced - even though the earnings
of the employees of logging companies were pitifully small. One
reason why they were so low was that the logging companies
continued the highly dubious tradition of the colonial era of
paying workers in part, directly or indirectly, with alcohol. An
alcohol-dependent workforce is a very cheap and, when sober,
compliant workforce.
It was this abuse that had, at least since 1906, been the subject
of local resistance. Unsurprisingly it was the women who had
played a particular role in objecting to their menfolk being made
violent by alcohol. With this long tradition of usually ineffective
resistance, a number of local organisations had emerged. Some
of these came to be the embryo out of which the Chipko
movement was born. The Sarvoyda movement was one such. In
an attempt to offer an alternative, the Sarvoyda movement had
formed a road construction co-operative which was able to pay
double the wages, in cash, of the contractors brought in by the
logging companies. Later, the same group re-established
diemselves as a co-operative (Sangh) using local timbers for tool-
making. From this they expanded into saw-milling, buying a few
trees at a time from the Forestry Department and selling planks,
either locally for construction purposes, or exporting them to
the plains.
This may have proved an effective way of countering some
of the worst evils of payment by liquor, but of course it only
exacerbated pressure on the forest. Indeed, this pressure
increased as the logging companies outbid the Sangh for stands
of trees sold by the Forestry Department - and then bribed
Forestry officials to allow them to cut unscheduled timber to
make good the profits foregone by the original overbid.
It is worth emphasising here that the Forestry Department,
so easily represented as the evil genius, was in many respects
doing its job. Its job was to exploit the forest for the benefit of
State revenue. It therefore had an interest in maximising
revenues from the logging companies and if one way of doing
that was to allow some of their officials to make a little on the
side by compensating the logging companies for extravagant
prices—well, who loses? The lock-step with the logging
companies and the Forestry Department, and the State Treasury
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behind the latter, thus ensured that they marched together to
crush resistance or competition offered by any organisations that
forest dwellers could put together.
It was neither commercial competition nor political resist-
ance from the Sangh that began to break the lockstep. It was
the major floods of the Alaknanda river in 1970 in which over
two hundred people lost their lives and, perhaps more politically
significant, which resulted in major silting problems in the plains
which crippled irrigation and power-generation for six crucial
months. Was this one of those random acts of God which
occasionally afflict us all? Or did it have a much more obvious
cause? The Sangh took the second view, producing in a detailed
report to the state Government evidence of over-logging, clear-
cutting, poorly-designed access roads, and the denudation of
steep slopes which, taken together, would inevitably result in
accelerated run-off, massive landslides and destructive surges of
flood water in a heavy monsoon. The forest was being destroyed.
It was taking a terrible revenge. And it was the forest dwellers,
whose natural habitat was being destroyed by both man and
nature, who would pay the highest price. The Government
ignored the report.
The Sangh realised that it was confronting hugely powerful
vested interests. Protests, marches, education campaigns,
meetings with journalists, politicians, senior civil servants—all
proved useless. Useless but irritating. After two years of continual
pressure, the Forestry Department sought to destroy the Sangh
by refusing to sell it any wood for its tool workshop. A hungry
Sangh would be a silent Sangh.
The Forestry Department misjudged the Sangh. By adding
insult to injury by selling the trees to the Simon Company, a
manufacturer of sports goods from the plains, the Forestry
Department created a powerful rallying cry: tennis racquets
before tools. It was out of the mass protest against the
activities of the Simon Company, the sports goods manufacturer,
that Chendi Prasad, the moving spirit behind the Sangh,
developed the notion of hugging trees (Chipko means 'to
hug' or 'cling to'). The Sangh was to resist the loggers of the
Simon Company non-violently but at great personal cost. If
the loggers wished to take the trees, they could do so—but only
by putting their axes through the torsos of the Sangh workers
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and their womenfolk who would cling to the trees marked for
cutting.
The Sangh won the initial face-off, but the Forestry Depart-
ment merely allocated the Simon Company an even better
stand of trees in another area. Hence the Chipko movement
spread—despite threats and physical violence offered by the
loggers as they found themselves constantly frustrated by
villagers throughout the region protecting the trees with their
own bodies.
The forest had its own say. In 1974 the Mandakini river
flooded even more disastrously than the Alaknanda four years
before. If some more observant officials in the plains were
beginning to wonder aloud about the increasing frequency and
the severity of flooding, such thinking made little impact in the
Forestry Department which continued its traditional role. To
Chendi Prasad and the Sangh it was almost inconceivable that,
in the same year that the Mandakini had flooded, the Forestry
Department sold a large stand of trees in one of the key catch-
ment areas of the Alaknanda river in the Reni region, thus
inviting yet another flood from the Alaknanda. Their attempt
to have the auction cancelled failed, but it did attract the
attention of a group of radical students who wanted to disrupt
the auction by methods the Sangh would not in the event
countenance.
The details of the final showdown at Reni read like a
Hollywood drama. The Government tried to lure the workers of
the Sangh away from the site by offering to pay compensation
for damage sustained during the Indo-Chinese war, claims that
they had resisted for fourteen years. The loggers were, however,
confronted by the women led by the redoubtable Gaura Davi
who, as eye witness reports have it, bared her breast and invited
them to shoot her as she hugged a majestic but marked tree.
The melodrama of this scene, initially reported by student
activists and checked out by responsible journalists, caught the
Indian imagination to such an extent that the Chief Minister of
Uttar Pradesh found himself under irresistible pressure to
meet with Chendi Prasad and the leadership of the Sangh.
Despite a long history of denunciatory rhetoric against the Sangh
and their claims that the logging companies were destroying
the forest and causing the floods, the Chief Minister eventually
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set up a committee of experts to examine the ecology of the
Uttar Kannad.
When it eventually reported, the committee went much
further than the Sangh. They declared the Reni forest and a
large section of the Alaknanda watershed a sensitive area and
requested that the Government put a ten-year ban on all tree
felling over an area of 450 square miles. This was gradually
extended as a result of pressure from the Chipko movement
and by the end of the 1970s the Forestry Department reversed
its normal policy and sought local advice, including that of the
Chipko workers, before auctioning any stands throughout the
region to logging companies.
Both the Department and the Chipko movement now
realised the destruction had already gone so far as to be in danger
of becoming irreversible. They therefore co-operated on a
massive reforestation programme far larger than the meagre
under-funded efforts that the Forestry Department had hitherto
been undertaking, in an attempt to re-establish forest cover
before the fragile top soils were totally leached off the hillsides.
In this way the resistive, obstructive activities of the Chipko
movement have been transformed into one of the most positive
signs of hope for the Uttar Kannad as a whole. But even that is
to sell Chendi Prasad and the Chipko movement short. Prasad
himself sees that the real issues are about human values. 'Our
movement goes beyond the erosion of the land to the erosion
of human values', he is quoted as saying. 'The centre of all this
is humankind. If we are not in a good relationship with the
environment, the environment will be destroyed and we will
lose our ground. But if you halt the erosion of humankind,
humankind will halt the erosion of the soil.'
The Chipko movement's story is worth telling in detail
because it illustrates exactly the point of our argument. It was
finally successful in changing both policy and consciousness for
a combination of five reasons. One, it organised poor people
around issues that they recognised as being crucially important
to their survival. Two, it developed a strategy that, however high-
risk it looked ante facto, was rooted in Gandhian non-violence
but was symbolically and visually appealing. Three, it became
proficient at collecting data which Government experts had to
take seriously. Four, it gave the most marginalised groups in the
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forest influence over their own future. The role of the women
should never be underestimated. And five, it combined through-
out its history a combination of positive action and resistance.
From the early days of the Sangh running a co-operative to
undermine the tradition of payment by liquor, to the engage-
ment of the whole Chipko movement in a massive reforestation,
Chipko showed that its struggle was not just about outsmarting
the Forestry Department, the State Government and the logging
companies. Perhaps most important of all, Chipko was about a
revolution of human values. It was not, despite much of the
popular literature, about saving trees. It was about charting an
evolution in the relationship between forest dwellers and their
environment. And that became a code, a symbol, for a much
deeper debate about the symbiosis of humankind and the wider
environment. In this sense, Chipko is about environmental ediics
on the hoof; about the articulation of values by which a small
minority have always lived but which the majority of us have yet
to learn.
4. The Narmada Dam
This is a complex story about the same themes as Chipko—the
capacity of powerless people to change radically the ways of
operating of international capital and the State apparatus.
To set the background we need to keep separate two sets of
issues. The first set leads to the long-running hostility between
the three states in western India which share the waters of the
Narmada valley. The states involved—Gujarat, Maharashtra, and
Madhya Pradesh—each have similar needs for more water in
order to increase irrigation, thereby extending the acreage of
land available for double-cropping and all the employment and
income benefits associated with the 'green revolution'. Put like
that, it sounds cold-blooded and technocratic: anyone with
experience of Indian political life at state or local level knows,
however, that these issues arouse passions and ignite hostilities
that too frequently lead to bloodshed and to endemic rural
violence.
The rational way forward was for a collaborative deal, whereby
the three states would agree to a large dam, or set of dams, to
impound excessive run-off and thereby increase the supply of
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water for irrigation—but on a collaborative basis in which the
increased supply of water would be shared between the three
states.
The second set of factors surrounds the World Bank. There
are two somewhat contrasting points to make. The first is that
the building of the Narmada Dam, from 1985, coincides with
the period in which the World Bank was associated, not only in
India but throughout the developing world, with so-called struc-
tural adjustment programmes. This process of structural adjust-
ment had of course ideological overtones but, more important,
it had direct impact on the lives of most citizens of developing
countries and especially of the urban poor. In many countries
this led to considerable political instability and popular protest
and, although India needed less drastic structural adjustment
than many other countries, the sense of outrage suffered by
left-of-centre politicians was shared by many in the large and
vocal NGO sector in India who found themselves picking up
the pieces of shattered lives after the implementation of
structural adjustment reforms. In the minds of many, this raised
questions about sovereignty and accountability—and therefore
of democracy, the bank's leading political lodestone—which had
a resonance throughout formal and informal political life in
India.
Paradoxically, however, this period of unusually severe
criticism of the World Bank coincided with a period in which
the Bank itself—or at least elements within it, for the bank should
never be interpreted too monolithically—was becoming increas-
ingly disenchanted with models of economic development that
ignored issues of distribution and social justice. Increasingly
influenced by the international Non-Governmental Organisation
movement and the intellectual case for so-called 'real' aid—i.e.
aid which actually affects the lives of the poor, not just the lower
and middle classes—at least some elements at the Bank were
open to giving much more careful consideration to the
distributional impact of Bank policies and projects than would
have been the case in, for example, the 1970s.
When the Bank was invited to co-fund the Narmada Dam to
the (original) tune of $450 million, therefore, it was not difficult
for the 'real aid' champions within the Bank's operational
departments to ensure that the agreements between the Bank
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and the Government of India, acting for die diree states involved,
included what looked on paper to be remarkably liberal, indeed
progressive, clauses concerning the resettlement and rehabili-
tation (R&R) of those who would be displaced by the rising
waters of what would be one of the biggest dam projects in the
world. Perhaps—learning from previous bitter experience—
the Bank included in the agreement clauses that went far beyond
any previous equivalent agreements in terms of securing, not
only a higher standard of living for the oustees, but also
guarantees that their community cohesion would be respected
and reinforced in the process of resettlement. Even more sur-
prising, the oustees were guaranteed that they would be included
in a subsequent participative process of decision-making about
their resettlement and rehabilitation in their new environment.
With the wisdom of hindsight, these clauses look so generous
that one is obliged to ask how the various actors involved (the
Bank, the Government of India, the state governments in
Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh, and the not in-
considerable professional expertise upon which each could
draw) thought that they would be deliverable. It is hard to resist
the conclusion that, for at least some of the actors, the justi-
fication went somediing like this: die vast majority of the oustees
are tribal peoples, in Indian terms well below the horizon of
social and political visibility. They would therefore be unable to
enforce any conditions between the government of India and
the World Bank. Further, as the R&R terms would not need to
be enforced for a number of years, the dust would have by then
setded and the tribals could be cleared off without the expense
or administrative and political inconvenience implied in the strict
adherence to the terms of the agreement.
If that seems overly cynical an interpretation, credibility is
lent to it by the extraordinary role played by die Government of
Gujarat. In order to secure the agreement of the other parties
to the deal that began to take shape, the Government of Gujarat
offered to resettle oustees from Maharashtra and Madhya
Pradesh on an unlimited scale—despite the fact that Gujarat
itself was desperately short of arable land and even more short
of irrigable land which the terms of the agreement guaranteed
at a minimum of two hectares per farmer or major son of a
farmer. It is simply inconceivable that the Government of Gujarat
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would commit itself to so lavish a promise if it thought there was
any likelihood of it being forced to deliver. Subsequent events
revealed the high price attached to this degree of cynicism.
For a relatively short period it looked as though this
calculation might pay off. Although there was immediately
considerable opposition to the dam, primarily from oustees, the
early stages of construction brought with it a huge demand for
unskilled labour from which the inhabitants of the valley could
benefit. There was thus the typical division of opinion (which
we also noticed in Uttar Kannad) between those who were doing
very nicely out of the construction work, at least in the short
run, and those who, perhaps taking a longer view, were wholly,
and increasingly vocally, opposed to the whole conception of
the dam and sceptical of the R&R benefits. These latter formed
themselves into the BNA (the movement to stop the Narmada
Dam) and began a long series of meetings, rallies, protests,
demonstrations, public education campaigns and, critically,
networking with NGOs throughout India and subsequently
throughout the world. The Police Departments of the three states
concerned were, to put it at its lowest, not adept at handling
sustained non-violent protest with the result that human rights
abuses, in the form of police violence, police shootings of
unarmed crowds, and officially sponsored rape of women, grew
to levels unacceptable in a country not unused to the politics of
the rough-house. The worse the human rights violations, the
more national and international support the BNA garnered and
the more the official promoters of the dam were put on the
defensive.
As the preliminary work on the dam neared completion and
the prospect of actual inundation of villages in the valley floor
became real, so the deficiencies of the R&R programme became
evermore obvious and evermore alarming. Where resettlement
had taken place, however, poor planning, poor implementation,
poor consultation and inept administration led to two tragic
results. The first was that the host communities, often moved
out of their own traditional land to make room for the oustees,
became increasingly hostile, both to the oustees and to their
own local politicians, thus ensuring that, whatever the official
position of the State government, on the ground local adminis-
trators decelerated resettlement from very slow to almost stop.
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Second, oustees who had been resettled soon found the size of
the gap between promise and reality, and therefore tended to
move back to their native villages, spreading the word that it
was better to run the risk of drowning in a year or two than to
face the certainty of immediate starvation, social dislocation and
humiliation. Deceleration on the supply side was thus matched
by deceleration on the demand side, and the day when the sluices
would be closed and the waters rise grew ever closer.
By now, national and international concern had reached
such heights that the main partners—the Bank, the Government
of India, the State governments—agreed to an independent
review by a team led by the highly-respected Bradford Morse in
1992. Despite sustained vilification of the BNA and its allies by
politicians at all levels in India and, of course, officials at the
World Bank, the Morse Report not only upheld most of the
complaints of the BNA and its allies, but also came to the
conclusion that work could 'continue only with the help of
unacceptable means'. Despite the many layers of diplomatic
velvet, there could be no doubting what that meant. The Morse
Review Committee was convinced that the BNA and its allies
were so well organised and so determined that they would
prevent the completion of the dam unless confronted with the
moral equivalent of a civil war.
The Morse Report also produced damning, indeed shaming,
evidence that the Bank itself had not followed its own pro-
cedures, especially in terms of consultation and participation
with the oustees.
In March 1993, the bank withdrew from the project, stopping
any further funding, on the grounds that the Government of
India and the State Governments were in breach of the
contractual agreement of 1985. Never has the Bank's credibility
been so damaged, not least because it sought to place the blame
of what had become an irremediable situation on its partners
while independent evidence suggested that the Bank itself was
at least co-responsible for the mess.
Space does not permit a detailed account of subsequent
developments, which include a hearing by the Supreme Court,
a moratorium on further construction, a resumption of work—
and increasingly high profile and vociferous resistance. The
struggle continues.
358 SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
That this is an astonishing achievement for tribal peoples
from three states hardly needs emphasis here. To what can we
attribute its success? We suggest four things. First, as implied
in the opening paragraphs of this section, there was a remark-
able concurrence of widespread national and international
dissatisfaction with the technocratic and seemingly autocratic
modus operandi of the Bank. To that extent, Narmada was an
accident waiting to happen. Second, the very complexity of
the political relationships between the Government of India
and the State Governments on the one hand, and between
the Governments of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh
on the other, ensured that this was always going to be a
fragile operation. Third, the fact that the BNA was con-
stituted and led by tribals had a hugely significant symbolic
impact, both within India and beyond it. These are people
whom Western history has left behind and whom develop-
ment seldom touches. Combine the image of the tribals with
the image of the oustees (homeless, landless, the victims of
alien processes, the objects rather than the subjects of their
own history) and you have a powerful cocktail that, in an age
of instant communication via the Internet, can be exploited with
devastating effect. Fourth, and in some ways more prosaically,
the losers are more identifiable; more certain of their losses;
more geographically concentrated; and often more socially
and politically homogeneous than the gainers. Although the
dam's sponsors sought to mobilise potential beneficiaries
(and the actual beneficiaries among the tribals who had
found semi-permanent employment in the construction), they
were unsuccessful in generating a counter myth to that of the
oustees.
In conclusion, let a Vice-President of the World Bank have
the last word: 'If anyone had told me in 1985 that we would be
given a bloody nose by a bunch of illiterate tribals in Gujarat, I
would have told him to see a shrink.' Quite.
5. Eschatological Ethnography
These two cases, the Chipko movement and the Narmada Dam,
are miracles. In other words, they are unexpected events that
Christians nonetheless expect.
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In a narrative which privileges the mighty, the effectiveness
of the resistance mounted by these apparently powerless peoples
is baffling. It is difficult to account for their success in the face
of globally powerful interests. Christian dogmatic description,
by contrast, rehearses a narrative in which the humble and meek
are eschatologically exalted. The events in the Uttar Kannad
and in Gujarat do not represent the tragically normal encounter
between the mighty and the meek, of course. They are excep-
tional, and that makes them striking. Yet, at the same time, they
are what an eschatologically oriented Christian description of
the world expects to see. Our descriptions themselves are
inescapably eschatological for this reason, as we shall argue.
There is nothing novel in our claim that dogmatic theology
is best practised through ethnography. A move towards
descriptive rather than theoretical dogmatics can be seen in work
by Stanley Hauerwas, in commentary on his work by Samuel
Wells and in the work of Hauerwas' pupil William Cavenaugh.'r>
We differ from Hauerwas in choosing, for our examples, des-
criptions of patently non-Christian communities. Hauerwas
illustrates Christian virtues by describing Christians. Our focus
is not merely on the illustration of virtues, vitally important
though that is, but on the development of a broader world-view
through the medium of dogmatic description. That means there
is no reason for us to think we should confine our descriptions
to Christian milieux.
Our two programmatic assertions, that theological ethno-
graphy expects the unexpected and describes anything in which
God might be involved, obviously need refinement and further
illustration. We are nervous of saying too much. There is clearly
a danger of appearing to think that successes like those presented
here exemplify God's action in some special way. They may not.
Nor do we believe that a Christian perspective means one expects
success in clashes of this kind: the common experience is, on
the contrary, of tragedy and death. Rather, we are attempting
to show that in such descriptions one can say who God is and
15
 Stanley Hauerwas, 'The Ministry of a Congregation' in Christian Existence
Today (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1988), pp. 111-31; Samuel Wells, Transforming
Fate into Destiny (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998), pp. 135-40, 168-9; William
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what one expects in the world. We do not yet have a strong
enough hold on this idea to show how it might work out in
situations of radical failure, and for that reason descriptions of
cases which fail await a future occasion. It is tempting at this
stage to think that such descriptions would serve as confirmations
that when the magnificat in Luke's gospel describes a group
called 'the mighty', they are called mighty for a reason, although
their might is obviously illusory and shortly to be stripped from
them.
It seems to us that descriptions of miraculous accounts of
the humble and meek being exalted (in however temporary and
modest a fashion) discharge a dogmatic task very effectively.
For example, they help prevent thinking that God's rescue of
the poor is to be endlessly deferred: for that reason we must
describe these events, which both have already happened and
are still happening, as eschatological. They could also be
described as parables of trinitarian embodiment. That is, they
illustrate what is meant in theology by participation in God's
own life. This is risky because the groups in question are not
Christian. But it would be equally risky if they were Christian:
there is no guarantee that what we think of as the Church really
is the Church.
Our descriptions are anything but neutral. An eschatological
parable of trinitarian embodiment tells us something about what
it means to be powerless and yet to confound the mighty. It is
trinitarian because it shows how the many become one, in so far
as the powerless are understood to be participating in God's
power. Our approach can be contrasted with Hans Kung's Global
Ethics project. Where Kiing is convinced that the only hope for
the world is a Global Ethics, elaborated as a centrally adminis-
tered strategy for creaturely survival, we see God's kingdom in
disparate activities by local groups with no strategic global
agenda.16 Kiing identifies with the rich and powerful and calls
for reform at the level of the Reichstag, the White House and
the World Bank. This project may well be a success. However,
its success would be infinitely more surprising from a Christian
16
 For Kung's project see especially Hans Kiing, A Global Ethic for Global Politics
and Economics (tr.J. Bowden. London: SCM Press, 1997) and Hans Kung (ed.), Yes
to a GlobalEthic (London: SCM Press, 1996).
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dogmatic perspective than the tiny but significant victories of
forest dwellers and illiterate tribal peoples. Kting's project is
not trinitarian, in that its purpose is humanly to take the many
and strategically make them one. By contrast, we understand
trinitarian participation as God's gathering of the many and do
not view this as a purely human project. Our ethnographies have
to do with providence rather than social engineering, albeit a
providence that is transformative, not quietistic.
Despite what we consider the advantages of a trinitarian and
providential perspective, there is a danger of being enormously
foolish. An approach which emphasises local actions, and which
draws attention (in however eschatological a fashion) to the
success of the weak against the well-funded corporations of the
strong flips over very easily into a desperate optimism. Optimism
can support itself by telling stories like the ones recounted here
and immunise itself against despair by refusing to analyse global
trends and macro-economic structures. This is tempting, not
least because of the daunting complexity of global analysis. This
is not irresistible, however. We believe global analysis is not
powerful enough to yield the detailed information and secure
theory necessary to develop an effective global strategy. A
project like Kung's requires worrying generalisations. He must
generalise about religious traditions when he seeks what they
have in common, he must generalise about economic practices
when he seeks global solutions, and he must generalise about
moral commitments when he seeks policies that will be
acceptable to all parties. The consequence of this is that
particular communities may not fit: for a Global Ethics to work,
anomalies must be made to fit. For a global strategy, local
variations are a problem and a threat. A trinitarian model is not
impatient with local variations. Instead of trying to find a
generalising unitary view from the centre that will accommodate
all of them, it looks for different practices that arise as local
initiatives. From the perspective of a thinker like Kiing, the
drawback of our approach is that it places the burden of
imagination and action on forest dwellers and illiterate tribals
rather than on highly trained specialists and technicians working
in Europe and North America. Our hope is that from a
perspective that takes God seriously it is absurd to consider this
a drawback.
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What implications does this have for dogmatic theology? It
might seem we are advocating, in a grand way, an end to
systematic theology as it is conducted in modern universities:
we are not. Just as dogmatic theology is a larger category than
ethics, for Barth, so systematic theology is a larger category than
description, for us. Dogmatic theology reflects on poetry,
paintings, music and dance as well as ethnographic description.
One can draw attention to the dangers of emphasising the
'coherence' of theology, or of characterising Christianity as a
system of ideas which are more interesting than other systems
or which have fewer aporias. However, we do not wish to appear
to reduce theology to social anthropology, particularly as we
are doing anthropology far less competently than a trained
anthropologist does it. Regarding the latter, we are acutely aware
that our practice of description falls far short of a truly ethno-
graphic account, which must record crucial details concerning
kinship, property and gender, for example. A deeper considera-
tion of caste relations and the social position of tribals would
similarly enable our hurried sketches to bridge the gap between
anthropological and political-scientific modes of description.
Nevertheless, in recent work Stanley Hauerwas has struggled
against what he sees as the twin temptations of presenting
Christian thought as a disembodied system of ideas and doing
'Durkheim with an ecclesial twist'." We are attempting to help
address Hauerwas' problem. This problem arises precisely
because it is possible to think that theologians and anthro-
pologists have different jobs. At the risk of over-simplifying, we
think that it is one thing to distinguish dogmatics from ethno-
graphy, and another to separate them. It makes sense to
distinguish dogmaticians from ethnographers: each task requires
a particular training and a particular discipline. However, we
think it is fatal to identify the theologian with only one of these
disciplines. We suspect that Hauerwas' twin temptations arise
because such identification is often taken for granted. This article
tries to help solve this problem by insisting that description is
the medium in which dogmatics and ethnography include each
other.
17
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We insist that ethnography is dogmatics because description
already includes a metaphysic. The extreme aspect of this position
is contained in the assertion that dogmatic clarification does
not add anything substantial to the description itself. For that
reason, we believe that theologians should take ethnographic
description at least as seriously as dogmatics: indeed, the latter
(if it concerns 'the real') is, and should be, the slave of the
former. In other words, we are trying to emphasise what is
implied in using a description as an illustration. To use something
as an illustration already implies an agenda. It seems to us that
dogmatics is the part of theology which clarifies the agenda of
which parables are the illustrations. We wish to blur the line
between ethnographic description and parable. Hauerwas'
programmatic claim is that the part of theology which raises
moral claims is best done by illustration rather than by codifi-
cation: that is part of what the emphasis on narrative entails.
Our further claim is that this applies to all dogmatic theology
and not just to the part of it known as Christian ethics. Barth
has already adequately shown that dogmatics includes ethics.
Hauerwas insists that ethics is a matter of narrative illustration.
Our engagement with Foucault has suggested that description
is sufficient tor making dogmatic (and hence moral) claims, and
that dogmatic elucidation adds nothing substantial.
We wish to conclude by observing that this does not mean
dogmatics has no function: it means merely that dogmatic
elucidation is secondary to dogmatic description, and that
dogmatic theology should be practised by describing things. In
a slogan: dogmatics is for teaching Christians how to see. It is for that
reason that the descriptions of the Chipko movement and the
Narmada Dam are at the centre of this account. If, as we suggest,
ethnography is dogmatics, then the major implication of this
article is that theologians should attempt to become better
ethnographers. However, dogmatics is about more than vision.
It is also about transformation. It is true that ethnography has
not historically been connected to political activism (quite the
reverse: anthropology has its roots in colonialism). Here,
however, dogmatic theology may prove liberating for ethno-
graphy. The ethnography we are advocating is eschatological.
Precisely because God liberates the world to be the world,
dogmatic ethnography is forbidden to be description of the
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world merely 'as it is'. It also describes the world in the light of
'as it shall be'. Dogmatic ethnography pays attention to detail,
but it does so eschatologically: hence our interest in describing
the powerless in possession of power. Thus, to develop our
slogan, dogmatics is for teaching Christians to see with an eye on
transformation. Taking these issues further, however, lies outside
the scope of this paper. Our aim has been more limited: to raise
the status of ethnography as a Christian dogmatic discipline. To
narrate a more thorough-going connection between ethno-
graphy and eschatology, as well as to make the description more
genuinely ethnographic, remains a substantial task, however.
Discharging that task is too important to be left to the authors
of this paper. Our hope is that others may wish to join in working
out the implications of saying that ethnography is dogmatics.
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